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The Housing Ladder and Hong Kong Housing  
Market’s Boom and Bust Cycle* 
 
Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong 
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper presents evidence, based on the recent Hong Kong experience, 
for the existence of a “housing ladder effect.”  An increase of housing equity 
at the bottom of the ladder tends to translate into a trading up activity that will 
both increase housing market turnover and buoy up the entire housing market.  
Based on a natural experiment through the introduction of a public housing 
privatization scheme, this papers presents evidence supporting this story using 
a logit model and a price-volume causality test. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Although Hong Kong is well known as a bulwark of free market capitalism, 
the government plays a major role in the housing market of Hong Kong.   As 
Table 1 shows, over 46% of Hong Kong’s households live in “public housing,” 
which is a rather misleading term considering that some 36% of this “public 
housing” are privately owned.  “Public housing” in Hong Kong refers to all 
publicly subsidized accommodations.  The government also controls the new 
supply of land, which used to be put up for auction periodically but since the 
Asian Financial Crisis developers have been asked to apply for auction any plot 
of land put on the “Application List” announced every year.  The government, 
through its Planning Department, also directly controls land use types and land 
use intensity through zoning regulations.  In addition its Building Department 
scrutinizes and approves building plans, carries out audit checks on 
construction works and issues occupation permits upon completion of new 
buildings.  Obviously, then, the Hong Kong government has much direct 
control of the new housing supply.  Moreover, because any purchase of 
housing is typically financed through the banking sector, the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority’s “guidelines” about loan ratios, which it expects all local 
banks to follow, will have big impact on the demand side.  The Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority is also instrumental to the setting up of the Hong Kong 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Don Haurin, Francois Ortalo-Magne, Charles Leung, participants from a 
HKIMR workshop, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. Support 
from the RGC Grants Committee of Hong Kong (LU3008/00H) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Mortgage Corporation in 1997, whose mission is “to enhance the stability of the 
banking sector by offering a reliable source of liquidity, to promote wide 
homeownership, and to facilitate the growth and development of debt security 
and mortgage-backed security in Hong Kong.” 
 Just as Bardhan et.al.(2003) pointed out about Singapore, private sector 
housing in Hong Kong cannot be understood without a good grasp of the role 
the public sector plays in the housing market.  In this paper, we are particularly 
interested in the role public housing plays in the household savings and “trading 
up” activities.   
 
Table 1. Households by Types of Accommodation 
First Quarter 1995 2000 2005 
Total(thousands) 1,755 2,014 2,265 
    %    %    % 
Permanent Public Housing 46.8 45.9 46.3 
- rental Units 36.4 31.4 29.6 
- subsidized for-sale units 10.4 14.5 16.7 
Private Permanent Housing 50.2 52.4 52.4 
Public Temporary Housing 1.1 0.1 - 
Private Temporary Housing 1.9 1.6 1.3 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority 
 
 The history of public housing in Hong Kong began with the famous 1953 
Shek Kip Mei fire that destroyed the homes of some 50,000 people who lived in 
the squatter huts there.  Largely as a stop-gap measure, temporary housing was 
constructed for them and in the following year the government decided to 
construct low-cost rental housing that were then called “resettlement estates.”  
The low cost rental housing program was expanded and improved, culminating 
in the completion of the Wah Foo Estate in 1971, which was the first public 
housing development planned using a “new town” concept.  Subsidized 
for-sale housing did not begin until 1978.  From then on “Home Ownership 
Scheme”(HOS) housing as it is called became very popular.  Public housing 
tenants were given priority to buy these units.  HOS housing not only provided 
an avenue for these tenants to improve their living conditions but also to vacate 
their units to make way for people waiting in the queue for the rental units.  As 
it happens, HOS housing also provided the Housing Authority with a steady 
stream of profits that more than offset the losses for running the rental housing 
program.   
 A major policy change was approved in 1986.  In order to make sure that 
public resources are used effectively to help the needy, the Housing Authority 
began to implement a policy of charging double rents for tenants who had 
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resided in public rental housing for over 10 years and whose incomes had 
breached the “subsidy income limit.”  The policy was to be implemented in 
1987.  As it happens, this policy has far-reaching consequences both on the 
government’s finances and on the private housing market.  The Hong Kong 
experience with this policy change, and with still another policy change 
announced in December 1997 that effectively overturns this earlier policy, 
provides an interesting case study and insight into the working of the housing 
market. 
 In the next Section, we will offer a sketch of the quality continuum of the 
Hong Kong housing market, and explain how the policy of charging higher 
rents for richer tenants may affect the trading up activities of homeowners.  
We will argue that the “housing ladder effects,” which will be defined in that 
section, are very much behind the booms and busts of an economy.  Two 
working hypotheses will be developed, which will then be tested in Section 3 
and Section 4.  In Section 3, we present a logit model that takes advantage of a 
natural experiment resulting from a policy change that allows us to examine 
how the propensities of different households to trade up change after home 
equity values have changed.  Section 4 presents further statistical evidence, 
indicating that housing prices generally drive transactions in existing homes, 
providing further support to the housing ladder hypothesis.  Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Hong Kong Housing Market and the Nature of the Housing Ladder 
 The Rating and Valuation Department distinguishes five types of housing 
from A to E.  Category A refers to housing with an area below 40 square 
meters.  E refers to housing with an area 160 square meters or above.  But 
private housing in Hong Kong is extremely diverse, from much run-down 
premises dating back to pre-war times to very well decorated luxury villas with 
gardens and club facilities, and they are located in various locations with a huge 
degree of variations in accessibility and desirability.  Prices per square foot 
could vary from less than 2,000 dollars a square foot to over 20,000 dollars a 
square foot. 
 In Hong Kong although private housing is generally more costly than public 
housing, many private housing units are in poor shape, and people often live in 
overcrowded conditions with several households sharing one small flat.  While 
many private housing units continue to deteriorate over the years with little or 
no maintenance, there has been an ongoing effort to improve the quality of 
public housing.  The standard in terms of space per tenant has been rising(See 
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Appendix Table 1), and older buildings are demolished with tenants to be 
moved in newer, better equipped buildings. 
 When the Tenant Purchase Scheme(TPS) was announced in December 1997, 
the Housing Authority claimed that by providing an opportunity for sitting 
tenants to buy their own units cheaply, the TPS provided tenants with the first 
step in the home ownership ladder so that they could begin to move up to better 
and better quality housing.  However, in fact the first step in the 
homeownership ladder for many is actually a place in the heavily subsidized 
public rental housing.  This has become increasingly evident in the early 
1990s.  As shown in Table 2a and Table 2b, public housing tenants(PHT) 
generally saved more than households in HOS housing, private rental 
housing(PRT), and private owner-occupied housing(PRO).  The discrepancy 
has enlarged tremendously from 1989/90 to 1994/95.  The Tables listed the 
monthly savings, in dollars, by income brackets.  It should be pointed out that 
these income brackets refer to the general Hong Kong population. 
 
Table 2a. Mean Monthly Household Savings by Type of Living Quarters by Income Group (1989/90) 
Mean Household Savings( HK $, Monthly) 
Income Group PHT HOS PRT PRO Overall 
Bottom 25% -503 n.a. -174 -631 -451 
25-49% 714 -277 -6 202 425 
50-74% 2924 1880 2187 2410 2499 
75-89% 6459 3552 5788 4989 5212 
Top 10 % 16635 15746 17915 14770 15845 
 
Table 2b. Mean Monthly Household Savings by Type of Living Quarters by Income Group (1994/95) 
Mean Household Savings( HK $, Monthly) 
Income Group PHT HOS PRT PRO Overall 
Bottom 25% -713 -2091 -724 -2773 -1041 
25-49% 2059 396 469 439 1221 
50-74% 6749 4103 1445 4225 4621 
75-89% 15716 11700 10981 12365 12565 
Top 10 % 40933 26217 26117 28229 27929 
Sources of both Tables 2a and 2b: Household Expenditure Survey 89/90, 94/95, Census and 
Statistics Department, reported in Watanabe (1998, Table 6.6) 
 
 From the Tables, it is clear that some of the richest households in Hong 
Kong continued to live in public housing, and they saved huge amounts of 
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money.  The Tables do not show the number of households in each income 
bracket, and it will be expected that most probably there were relatively fewer 
households in the richest 10% of households who lived in public rental housing 
than in private owner-occupied housing.  Nevertheless the figures highlight the 
validity of the belief that many of the tenants who had been living in public 
housing and had been enjoying the subsidized rents no longer needed such 
subsidies—this belief evidently was behind the policy of imposing higher rents 
on the so-called “rich tenants.” 
 The homeownership ladder refers to the tendency for homeowners to trade 
their existing homes for more expensive, better homes when they have 
accumulated sufficient equity in their homes and other savings, and when their 
ability to service larger loans has gone up.  Ortalo-Magne and Rady(2006) 
provided a theoretical framework explaining the working of the homeownership 
ladder.  For a tenant to become a homeowner, he must accumulate enough 
savings to pay the down-payment, which is not only often required but will help 
reduce the mortgage payments down the road.  This process will be faster if 
their rents are lower or if nominal incomes rise faster.  An official survey by 
the Hong Kong Housing Authority showed that in 1992-1993 as much as 24 per 
cent of housing transactions were due to public housing tenants and as much as 
13 per cent of public housing tenants owned one or more homes.1  This 
provides some evidence that a public rental housing program, by allowing 
households to pay low rents, also boosts their savings and hence the ability to 
buy a home.  Although hard to verify, there is a good likelihood that the 
increased interest in buying a home among public housing tenants may be 
related to the “public housing subsidy policy” that began to be implemented as 
of 1987.  If the subsidy is reduced through being charged double rent, the 
attractiveness of staying in public housing will be reduced.  Since the talk of 
the day had been raising the rents for the rich tenants even higher to eliminate 
any subsidy, it made sense to get prepared. 
 Prior to 1998, HOS homeowners would always make a very good profit 
when they sell their units, at which point they must repay the Housing Authority 
the land cost subsidy implicit in their purchase price.  They could sell their 
                                                 
1 “[A]bout 13% of PRH (public rental housing tenants) or 74 000 out of 580 000 households 
covered by a survey in July 1993 owned private domestic properties. Another survey on tenants in 
North Point Estate showed that 18% of them owned private domestic properties in the urban areas 
alone. Some one-third of these households owned more than one property and a small number even 
owned up to five properties. An independent exercise revealed that PHT tenants accounted for as 
much as 24% of all purchases of private flats by local individuals in the period October 1992 - 
March 1993. The survey results point to the prevalence among PRH tenants in private property 
ownership.” (HK Housing Authority, 1994) 
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units in the open market after having lived in their units for over 10 years.  
Starting in June 1997, however, there was a new arrangement that is called the 
HOS Secondary Market, which is a market with buyers restricted to “Green 
Form Applicants,”2  who are predominantly public rental housing tenants.  
HOS owners were allowed to sell from the fourth year after purchase and they 
did not need to repay the implicit land cost subsidy to the Housing Authority.3  
The fact that such transactions in the “secondary market” in 1997 were at very 
high prices (see Table 3) suggest that many public housing tenants were really 
cash-rich and that they had indeed played an important part in the very strong 
housing market in 1996 and 1997.   
 
Table 3. Actual Transactions of HOS Units in the Secondary Market, Fu Keung Court* 
Usable floor area 
High, Middle, 
or Low Floor 
Date of Agreement
to Purchase Price US$,000 
Land Premium 
Discount Rate (%)
644 Middle 09/1997 506.4 29 
644 High 11/1997 461.2 29 
645 Middle 04/1998 328.2 29 
645 Middle 10/1998 253.8 35 
* Fu Keung Court in Wang Tau Hom.  An exchange rate of HK$7.8 to 1 US dollar is assumed.  
Sellers do not have to pay the land premium discount when they sell in the secondary market that is 
restricted to public housing tenants.  The buyer will however have to repay the land premium 
discount upon resale in the future.  The land premium discount is calculated from the formula 
(Market Price – Sale Price)/Market Price at the time of original purchase. 
 
Source: Downloaded from Housing Authority website at the time of writing from: 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/chi/hd/hos/s_market/index.htm 
 
 The policy to deny well-off tenants the benefits of housing subsidies was 
further stepped up in June 1996.  Tenants paying double rent were required to 
declare their assets and would be required to pay market rent if the values of 
these assets exceeded specified limits.  This policy provided a big incentive 
for the well-off tenants to buy in the private market and gave much impetus to 
housing prices through 1997.   
                                                 
2 Other “Green Form Applicants” include: Authorized occupants of Interim Housing (IH) of the 
HA, Allowance recipients of the HA's Rent Allowance for Elderly Scheme (RAES); Applicants on 
the Waiting List, Junior civil servants applying for the HALS under the Civil Service Public 
Housing Quota, Clearees and victims affected by clearance and natural disaster respectively, or 
Domestic tenants affected by Urban Renewal Authority's redevelopment programme. or Divorcees / 
splitting households of the HA estates who are issued with Green Form Certificates.  
3 From June 1999, HOS owners can sell after two years from the date of purchase in the secondary 
market without repayment of the land premium subsidy.  The open market resale date was also 
reduced from 10 years to 5 years. 
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 Strangely, however, this policy was inadvertently reversed in December 
1997, when the Housing Authority announced the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme(TPS).  Sitting tenants, regardless of whether they were “well-off” or 
not, were allowed and encouraged to buy their units at as much as 88% discount 
from the estimated market price.  Although well-off tenants were later denied 
the “discount upon discount” offered other tenants buying within the first year 
of announcement that their units were for sale, by allowing the richer tenants to 
buy their own units at any discount is still tantamount to giving away the future 
subsidies as a gift in a one-off deal.  It will reduce the incentives of the richer 
tenants to buy in the private market.   
 From this discussion, we propose two groups of hypotheses that may be 
tested.  The first is based on the differential effects of the TPS on the 
probabilities of different households to buy a private sector home.  The 
introduction of the TPS is like a natural experiment.  The offer of deep 
discounts available for sitting tenants to buy their own flats—whose quality has 
been steadily improved over the years relative to HOS housing—effectively 
lured public housing tenants to stay in public housing even though they can 
afford to buy HOS or private housing.  We expect therefore that there will be a 
marked change in the probabilities of the richer public housing tenants to buy a 
home following the announcement of the TPS.  The same cannot be said of the 
poorer tenants, whose probabilities to buy a private unit had always been low.  
Results of an empirical test based on these hypotheses are presented in Section 3.  
 The second group of hypotheses is based on the effects of housing price 
changes on transactions in existing homes, as discussed in Stein(1995).   
While Stein’s model is static, the consideration that transactions at the lower 
tiers of the housing ladder that are related to price movements will lead to more 
transactions “up the ladder” would imply that when housing prices rise, trading 
up activities will be transmitted throughout the housing market.  Similarly, 
when housing prices decline, trading up activities decline that decline in the 
first instance will lead to further declines in transactions.  We therefore 
hypothesize that housing prices will “Granger-cause” transactions in existing 
homes.  Section 4 will present evidence in Hong Kong. 
 
3. Tests Using A Logit Model 
 
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 The work reported in this section is based on a survey conducted by the 
authors in September 2002 using the facilities of the Survey Research Program 
of Lingnan University.  It was a telephone survey using the 
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random-digit-dialing sampling method. The target respondents were heads of 
households (HD) aged 25 or above.  Table 4 presents the distribution of the 
2031 sample households by key characteristics.  These are domestic 
households by type of quarters, tenure of accommodation, and monthly 
household income.  At the sample size of our survey, we more or less 
duplicated the distribution by key characteristics in the official data supplied by 
the Census & Statistics Department, lending credence to our results.  We 
should, however, add the caveat that the household income categories are as 
reported at the time of the survey, and that there must have been some upward 
or downward mobility during the 10 years covered in our study.  If there are 
no major systematic effects on the upward or downward mobility of households 
in different income categories, our results would still stand. 
 
3.2 Variables and the Model 
 Table 5 presents the list of dummy variables and their definitions. The 
dependent variable – Ownership of a Private or an HOS unit - is a qualitative 
variable which was coded as 1 if the respondent answered positive to the 
question about ownership of a home(other than a TPS unit) acquired either 
within the five year window before or within the five year window after 
December 31, 1997.  The number of observations for the dependent variable is 
based on valid responses only (i.e. all missing values were excluded from the 
analysis).  As a result the sample size for this variable was reduced by 24. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Sample and Official Statistics 
 Sample Statistics** 
(%) 
Official Statistics* 
(%) 
Domestic Households by Type of Quarters: 
Public rental flats 36.3 31.1 
Government subsidized sale flats 18.9 17.3 
Private residential flats 44.8 
(n=2024) 
51.7 
 
Domestic Households by Tenure of Accommodation: 
Owner-occupier 58.3 52.9 
Sole tenant 40.3 39.4 
Co-tenant 1.2 2.6 
Provided by employer 0.2 
(n=2021) 
2.5 
 
Domestic Households by Monthly Household Income: 
Below $10,000 31.8 28.6 
$10,000 - $25,000 40.9 39.4 
$25,000 or above 27.3 
(n=1659) 
32.0 
 9
*Source: Distribution based on Quarterly Report on General Household Survey, July to September 
2002, Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR government and ignores temporary housing.  
**Note: Percentages are based on valid responses.  Responses “Don't Know” and “Refuse to 
Answer” to the question about tenure were excluded from the calculation.   
 
 The explanatory variables Age and Income were coded as categorical 
variable with three groups.  Here we treat “Don't Know” responses and 
“Refuse to Respond” as “Not Available” and use a dummy variable (=1) to 
capture such responses. “Public Housing Tenant” (PHT) is a dummy variable 
which assumes the value of unity for both current and past public housing 
tenants. We then created three interactive dummy variables by multiplying the 
PHT to the three income dummies (see Table 5.). The coefficients on these 
interactive terms would capture the effect of public housing tenancy for any 
given income category.  
 
Table 5. Definitions of Qualitative Variables 
Variable Value 
Dependent Variable  
Ownership of Either Private or HOS Unit 1 = acquisition of a private or HOS flat within the 
specified 5 year window, 0 = renter or TPS owner
 
Independent Variable 
 
Household Income 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 - $25,000 (reference group) 
$25,000 or above 
Not available* 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = not available, 0 = other income groups 
Tenancy in Public Housing (PHT) 
Have you ever been a public housing tenant? 
 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Age 
25 - 39 
40 - 49 
50 or above (reference group) 
Not available* 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = not available, 0 = other age groups 
Not available, including “don't know” responses and “refusals”, is a dummy variable (=1) 
 
 The logistic regression model that we use to estimate the probability of 
owning a private or HOS unit takes the following form: 
εαβ iiiY += '  ------------ (1) 
where Yi = 1 denotes homeownership(other than TPS units), α’i is a vector of 
observable characteristics (i.e. age, income and residence of public housing) for 
the Head of Household i and β is the associated coefficients (including a 
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constant). εi denotes the error term. The estimated logistic regression 
coefficients can be used to calculate the probability of i’s being a buyer of a 
housing unit in the respective time “windows” before and after the TPS. The 
standard equation (Greene, 1993, p.638) is as follows: 
]1[
)1homeowner(Pr
)(
)(
'
'
'
'
e
e
i
iob i αβ
αβ
+
==  -------------- (2) 
 The logit model allows us to determine if the probability of purchasing 
private residential flats or HOS housing would be affected by a household’s 
having lived in public rental flats or not.  In principle there are two effects.  
The first is that, since tenancy in public housing is fairly secure and is very 
economical, tenants may perceive less need for purchase of a private or HOS 
flat(“the substitution effect”).  The second is that, since public housing tenants 
pay less rent, they receive an extra income in kind and therefore would 
accumulate more savings and thus will be in a better position to buy(“the 
income effect”).  We expect that the latter effect is stronger for the richer 
tenants who may perceive their tenure as less secure, and weaker for the less 
well-off tenants.  We hypothesize, in particular, that richer public housing 
tenants had the highest probability to buy a home before TPS and that with TPS 
this group’s propensity to buy a home other than TPS would decline.  
 To determine these effects we introduce three interactive dummies - 
dummies for the low, middle and high income groups multiplied to the PHT 
dummy - into our model.4  The coefficients on these interactive terms depict, 
for the respective income brackets, the additional effects of tenancy in public 
rental housing.  We expect that the coefficient on the interactive term for the 
group with highest household income (i.e. $25,000 or more, who are threatened 
with double or higher rent) to be positive, while that for the middle and lower 
income groups to be smaller or even negative.  Since the TPS was announced 
in December 1997 and launched in January 1998, we consider two “windows” 
for the home purchase decision: the five years up to the end of 1997 and the 
five years from January 1998.  In particular, the regressions were run against 
the dependent variable of having bought a private or an HOS flat in these two 
respective periods. These tests will allow us to determine if the TPS had 
produced differential effects on the incentive to buy in the private/HOS flats 
among the different income groups.  To highlight the possible different effects 
of the TPS on repeat buyers and first time homebuyers, we add age dummies, in 
Model 2 and 2’, to see if the coefficients on the age dummies had changed after 
the launch of the TPS and if so how.  It should however be noted that all the 
information was collected in September 2002.  As a result the latter window is 
                                                 
4 See the caveat noted at the end of Section 1. 
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slightly smaller than the earlier window.  In addition all income and age 
information reported pertain to the time of the survey, i.e., September 2002. 
 
Empirical Results 
 Table 6 indicates that all of the variables were of the expected signs and 
were significant. In particular, for Model 1, which did not control for age effects, 
generally higher income households are more likely to buy a flat(32.8% more 
likely for those with household income at HK$25000 and above than the 
reference group, as compared with only 25.7% more likely for those in the 
middle income range).  Moreover, the relative sizes and signs of the interactive 
income/tenancy status dummies are also as expected.  Before TPS, high 
income households who also live in public housing were about 19.2% more 
likely to buy than similar income households who do not live in public housing, 
indicating that the income effect dominates the substitution effect.  Middle 
range income households, who perceive their tenures as secure, on the other 
hand, are less likely to buy if they lived in public housing.(roughly 24.7% and 
38.6% less for those with monthly incomes between HK$10,000 and 
HK$25000, and those with incomes below HK$10,000 respectively5) 
 Table 6 shows that in 1998 and beyond, the marginal probability of buying 
a home apparently increased for all income categories.  This might have been 
due to the large decline in housing prices after 1997, which rendered homes 
much more affordable.  Note, however, these marginal probabilities may be 
misleading in that they do not by themselves indicate the projected probabilities 
of particular groups of people, which must be estimated based on the actual 
characteristics of such groups.  We will present these in Table 7. 
 Most noteworthy is the fact that from 1998, after TPS had been 
implemented, richer tenants living in public rental housing became no longer 
more likely to buy homes than their counterparts in the private rental housing 
market.  Prior to 1998, Table 6 shows that the marginal probability for “well 
off public housing tenants” to buy a home, holding all other characteristics at 
their mean values, stood at 19.9%.  After 1997, i.e., after the announcement of 
the TPS in December 1997, this marginal probability almost vanished to zero.  
 Again, Model 2 and 2’ in Table 6 show that, after 1997, the marginal 
probability to buy for households headed by someone aged 25-29 rose 
                                                 
5 These marginal effects reported in Table 4 were evaluated for a household with household income 
between $10000 - $25000, age of head of household at 50-59, and with other interactive variables 
held at their respective means.  Mathematically, they were the derivatives of the probabilities with 
respect to a particular explanatory variable i :specifically, 
βαβ
αβ
ie i
e i
2])'(1[
)'(
'
'
+
 
 12
noticeably from 7% to 9% per cent and turned significant.  This is clearly 
related to the fact that home prices had dropped so much so that buying a home 
became within reach of such young households.  There is anecdotal evidence, 
frequently reported in newspapers, that developers were selling an increasing 
percentage of their new flats to first time buyers. 
 In contrast, those aged 40-49 who used to be 21.6% (marginal probability, 
Model 2, Table 6) more likely than those in their 50’s to buy lost their 
differential incentive(3.7%, Model 2’, and no longer significant).  The 
Chi-square statistics, which test whether a model as a whole predicts occurrence 
better than chance (testing of the joint significant of all i), are all highly 
significant.  This suggests that older buyers, who were more likely to be repeat 
buyers, suddenly became inactive.  This is consistent with the suggestion that 
the loss of buyers willing to pay a good price for existing homes had effectively 
“incapacitated” their trading up.  The introduction of the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme not only meant a decline in the number of buyers in the HOS and 
private homes market, but also had caused a dramatic decline in transactions 
volumes.  For the first time in all the history of the HOS since 1978, 1998 
recorded thousands of cases where committed buyers of new HOS units(who 
were chosen by a lottery mechanism) forfeited their down-payments.  The 
over-subscription rate dwindled.  Even though most of the supply was 
nevertheless absorbed, prices had to be cut.  In the earlier years those potential 
buyers from among the public housing who failed to get a place in the HOS 
lottery would spill over to the second hand HOS market and the private market.  
Now this stream of buyers either completely lost interest or were willing to pay 
only much lower prices.  With some 218,000 HOS owners suddenly finding 
that their units lost a major source of buyers, homeowners who had depended 
on them to buy their units found difficulty trading up to better homes in the 
private housing market.  Transactions in the existing home market plunged, in 
turn freezing transactions in the new homes market, which in the earlier years 
almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up (see Table 6). 
 Table 7 presents the simulated probabilities of a home purchase for public 
housing tenants and private housing tenants whose heads of households were 
aged 30 to 39.  It shows that the probability of a private or HOS flat purchase 
for public housing tenants within 5 years before 1998 was over 84% for those 
with a monthly household income at $25,000 or more.  This compares with the 
66.6% probability for tenants of private flats.  After 1998, the probability of 
buying a private or HOS flat for public housing tenants in this income bracket 
fell to 66%.   
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 In contrast, tenants in private flats with similar incomes and in the same age 
group saw only a marginal decline in the probability of home purchase.  This 
revelation, combined with the evidence of strong purchasing power of green 
form applicants prior to 1998, who were paying top prices for HOS units sold in 
the secondary market (Table 3), supports the theory that the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme has played an important role in reducing the interest of the richer 
public housing tenants to buy private homes and hence in the reversal of the 
housing market in 1998.  As Table 8 indicates, coinciding with the 
announcement of the TPS on December 8 1997, housing transactions 
plummeted in December 1997. 
 The next section will provide evidence, using time series techniques, that 
housing prices is an important driver of housing transaction volume, which will 
provide further evidence about the “down-payment effect” or “equity effect”6 
on home purchases. 
 
                                                 
6 “Equity effect” is a more general term that refers to the greater readiness of households to trade 
up the housing ladder as the equity in their homes rises.  It is more general because even if no 
down payment is needed, an increase in the equity of a home is still expected to raise the propensity 
to trade up. 
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Table 6. Logistic Regression Estimates of Ownership of Private Residential Flats 
 Pre-Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window  Post-Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window 
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 1’ Model 2’  
Variables Coefficient Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Constant -1.168*** 0.306 - -1.546*** 0.326 -  -2.197*** 0.471 - -2.343*** 0.480 - 
Household Income              
<$10,000 (ref. group) - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
$10,000 - $25,000  1.281*** 0.363 0.257 0.757** 0.381 0.149  1.949*** 0.518 0.289 1.690*** 0.526 0.249 
$25,000 or above 1.631*** 0.368 0.328 1.087*** 0.386 0.214  2.628*** 0.514 0.390 2.310*** 0.526 0.340 
Not available* 0.654** 0.340 0.131 0.343 0.352 0.067  1.443*** 0.496 0.214 1.346*** 0.499 0.198 
Interactive Dummy              
<$10,000 X PHT -1.920*** 0.417 -0.386 -2.085*** 0.426 -0.410  -1.259*** 0.570 -0.187 -1.286** 0.573 -0.189 
$10,000-25,000 X RRH -1.232*** 0.240 -0.247 -1.195*** 0.245 -0.235  -1.110*** 0.256 -0.165 -1.040*** 0.259 -0.153 
> $25,000 X PHT 0.957*** 0.291 0.192 1.010*** 0.297 0.199  0.039 0.298 0.006 0.053 0.301 0.008 
Age              
25 – 29 - - - 0.358 0.316 0.070  - - - 0.607** 0.282 0.089 
30 – 39 - - - 1.149*** 0.213 0.226  - - - 0.642*** 0.213 0.095 
40 – 49 - - - 1.098*** 0.208 0.216  - - - 0.251 0.215 0.037 
50 or above (ref. group) - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
Not available* - - - 0.756 0.555 0.149  - - - -0.856 0.807 -0.126 
Chi-square 261.23 (df=6)*** 397.45 (df=10)***  357.28 (df=6)*** 274.85 (df=10)*** 
Observation (n) 1181 1181  1161 1161 
Note: (1) ** & *** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 2) The sample size is smaller than is shown in Table 4 because (a) there are missing values, ( b) only flat owners who bought their flats within 
the 5 year window before 1998 (1993-1997) or within the 5 year window after December 1997 were included in the analysis,( c) owners were divided into two groups – before and after 1998 d) those owners who 
forgot which year(s) that they bought their flat(s) were treated as missing values. 
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Table 7. Estimated Probability of Ownership of Private Residential Flats for Household 
Head aged at 30-39 
 Prob. of Purchase in pre- 
Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window
 Prob. of Purchase in post 
Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window 
 
 PHT = 1 PHT=0 Ratio PHT = 1 PHT=0 Ratio 
<$10,000  0.0771 0.4020 0.19 0.0480 0.1543 0.31 
$10,000 - $25,000 0.3026 0.5890 0.51 0.2590 0.4973 0.52 
$25,000 or above 0.8455 0.6660 1.27 0.6597 0.6477 1.02 
Notes: PHT=1 implies household is public housing tenant; PHT=0 implies household is 
private tenant. 
 
Table 8. Monthly Transactions of Private Homes 
Year/Month 
First Hand 
Homes 
Monthly 
Changes (%) 
Second Hand 
Homes 
Monthly 
Changes (%) 
97/07 2,147 - 17,227 - 
97/08 2,044 -4.8 8,595 -50.11 
97/09 1,396 -31.7 7,800 -9.25 
97/10 2,174 55.73 8,315 6.60 
97/11 1,343 -38.22 8,653 4.06 
97/12 364 -72.9 3,804 -56.04 
98/01 2,334 541.21 3,598 -5.42 
98/02 868 -62.81 2,883 -19.87 
98/03 2,636 203.69 5,501 90.81 
98/04 649 -75.38 4,683 -14.87 
98/05 2,429 274.27 4,364 -6.81 
98/06 3,871 59.37 3,413 -21.79 
98/07 1,880 -51.43 3,337 -2.23 
98/08 2,603 38.46 3,427 270 
98/09 824 -68.34 3,303 -3.62 
98/10 3,724 351.94 2,681 -18.83 
98/11 6,203 66.57 4,974 85.53 
98/12 3,578 -42.32 5,946 19.54 
99/01 1,999 -44.13 5,012 -15.71 
99/02 1,951 -2.4 3,268 -34.80 
99/03 2,589 32.7 3,640 11.38 
99/04 3,507 35.46 4,313 18.49 
99/05 4,173 18.99 5,063 17.39 
99/06 1,516 -63.67 4,517 -10.78 
99/07 1,394 -8.05 4,317 -4.43 
99/08 777 -44.26 3,871 -10.33 
99/09 568 -26.90 3,072 -20.64 
99/10 1,400 146.48 2,797 -8.95 
99/11 661 -52.79 3,422 22.35 
99/12 1,022 54.61 3,273 -4.35 
Source: Centaline Property Agency Ltd. 
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4. Impact of Property Price on Second Hand Transactions Volume 
 In this Section, we present the results of a causality test between the 
property price (LnPPI) and second hand home transactions volume 
(LnSTran). We first test the stationarity properties of the variables (LnPPI 
and LnSTran) by using the ADF test. The results are presented in Table 9 
which indicate that both are I(1) variables. This shows that the Johansen 
procedure is appropriate for testing long run relation between these two 
variables. Table 10 shows that they are indeed cointegrated.  With the 
long-run coefficient for the LnSTran positive and significant (see Table 11), 
an increase in property prices will boost the second hand transactions 
volume.  We use the long-run cointegrating equation to generate the error 
correction term to be used in the causality test equations.  Two regressions 
are to be run: 
 
-------  [3] 
 
-------  [4] 
 
where ECM is the lagged error term obtained from the cointegrating 
equation between LnPPI and LnSTran.  Short-run Granger causality from 
LnPPI to LnSTran will be demonstrated if the coefficients of the lagged 
independent variables are found to be jointly significantly different from 
zero (Ho: ?1+?2+?3+…. = 0 -- based on the F-statistic).  Long-run 
Granger causality from LnPPI to LnSTran will be demonstrated if the 
coefficient on the lagged ECM term is negative and statistically significant 
(Ho: ?= 0 -- based on the t-statistic). The second channel of causation 
represents the adjustment of the dependent variable to its long-run value.  
 
Table 9. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
LnPPI  
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.2264 
-5.6593*** 
-2.8597 
-5.6401*** 
I(1) 
 
LnSTran 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.9880 
-13.1256*** 
-2.4257 
-13.0912*** 
I(1) 
 
LnFTran Level -8.9940*** -8.9949*** I(0) 
Notes: (1) The optimal lag in ADF test is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. (2) 
95% CV for the ADF statistic with trend and without trend are 2.8903 and -3.4548 
respectively (3) *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 10. Testing Cointegration between LnPPI and LnSTran 
Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis Test Statistics 5% Critical Value 
Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r? 1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
50.51*** 
2.03 
 
λ max Value 
48.49*** 
2.03 
 
17.86 
8.07 
 
 
14.88 
8.07 
Notes: (1) the lag length of the VAR (=3) is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(2).*** denotes significance at 1% level and r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
(3) As individual series clearly exhibits trending pattern, we consider regressions with 
unrestricted constant. 
 
Table 11. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Johansen Cointegration 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 3.8619 
LnPPI 1.0212 (-1.7665)* 
* denotes 1% and 10% significance level respectively.  
 
Table 12. Causality Tests between LnSTran and LnPPI using the VECM Approach 
 Ho: LnPPI does not cause LnTran Ho: LnTran does not cause LnPPI 
 ??i = 0 : F-stat ?= 0 : t-st t ??i = 0 : F-stat ?= 0 : -stat 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
5.9117 
(0.000)*** 
-0.5692 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0040 
(0.390) 
0.0437 
(0.005)*** 
Notes: The lag length (=3) of the VAR is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion 
 
 The results of the causality test using the VECM approach are 
presented in Table 12. The ECM coefficients enter significantly both when 
the LnPPI and LnSTran are treated as the dependent variable. We can 
conclude that there is a bi-directional positive causal relation between the 
LnSTran and LnPPI in the long run through the equilibrium mechanism. 
However, the F-test showed that only those ∆LnPPI lagged dynamic terms 
(in equation 1) are jointly significant. Therefore, we can conclude that 
there is uni-directional causality in the short-run from LnPPI to LnSTran 
through the dynamic terms but not the other way round. If TPS reduced the 
interest of public housing tenants to buy a private or HOS unit, as 
demonstrated in the previous section, and if this contributed to a decline in 
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housing prices, the finding here lends support to the argument that TPS had 
a significant negative impact on transactions volumes.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 We have presented two sets of statistical results to support the thesis 
that a “housing ladder effect” exists whereby an increase in equity at the 
bottom of the ladder readily transmits through the housing ladder and the 
second hand or existing housing market to the top, while a decline in 
equity at the bottom would similarly transmit through the housing ladder 
up.  This result is significant as it increases our understanding about the 
booms and busts of the housing market.  We found that prior to the launch 
of the Tenants Purchase Scheme public housing tenants who were 
reasonably well off had a much higher probability of home purchase 
compared to private housing tenants with similar incomes, and that they 
had been paying high prices for homes in the secondary HOS market.  
The purchase activities of public housing tenants certainly had played a 
role in the housing market boom prior to 1998.  With the launch of the 
TPS the relative higher propensity to purchase for public housing tenants 
disappeared.  Their reduced demand for HOS and private flats again 
appear to have played a part in the housing market wind-down after 1997. 
 The first set of statistical tests, based on data collected by the authors 
in a survey at the end of 2002, represents cross-sectional analysis using the 
logit regression approach.  The results show a clear and interesting pattern.  
The propensity to purchase always increases with household incomes, and 
for high income households only, was higher among public housing tenants 
than private housing tenants prior to 1998.  After 1997, the propensity to 
purchase fell for all households, but it fell particularly hard for the well-off 
public housing tenants.  Both the timing of this change and economic 
theory suggest that the Tenants Purchase Scheme announced on 8 
December 1997 played a role.  The other set of statistical tests, based on 
official published data, represent time series analysis using modern 
cointegration-cum-causality test approach.  It shows that housing prices 
have a positive impact on second hand(existing home) transactions.  This 
is consistent with the theory that the housing ladder effect works through 
existing homes.  Because many things happen in 1997, and in particular, 
the Asian Financial Crisis broke out in July of that year, it is not possible to 
definitively disentangle the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis from those 
of the TPS, and it is probably inappropriate to blame all the collapse of the 
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housing market in 1998 to the TPS.7  But it seems clear that the housing 
ladder effect has a part to play both in the boom and in the bust of the 
Hong Kong housing market.  The Hong Kong story lends support to 
Ortalo-Magne and Rady’s hypothesis about the “critical role of marginal 
first-time buyers in housing market fluctuations,” and underscores the 
symmetric effects that changes in the purchasing activities of first time 
buyers may have on the entire housing market. 
 
Table 13. Indicators of Changes of Confidence 1997:4-2000:4 
 
Hang Seng Index 
At End of Period 
The US$ Premium on the HK Dollar 
in the 1-Year Forward Market 
2000:4 15095 -154 
2000:3 15649 -142 
2000:2 16156 -9 
2000:1 17406 48 
99:4 16962 396 
99:3 12733 909 
99:2 13532 959 
99:1 10942 1547 
98:4 10049 1512 
98:3 7883 4235 
98:2 8543 4201 
98:I 11519 2396 
97:4 10807 4036 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority and http://beta.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EHSI 
Negative values in the US$ premium on the HK$ in the forward market suggest an 
expectation that the Hong Kong dollar would appreciate.  The Table shows a clear RISE in 
confidence from 1997Q4 to 1998Q1. 
                                                 
7 Table 13 indicates that confidence, though damaged to some extent by the Asian Financial 
Crisis, had actually been restored to some extent in the first quarter of 1998, but prices and 
transactions fell most dramatically in the first quarter of 1998. 
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Appendix Table A1: Developments of Living Space and Living Density Standards on 
Public Rental Housing 
Pre-1973 Group A Estates (i.e. Government Low Cost Housing and Housing 
Authority estates): The allocation standard was that the Net Living Area 
(NLA) which is the net living space excluding kitchen, toilet and balcony 
would not be less than 35 sq. ft. (3.25m2) per person. Children were counted 
as adults or, for those under 10 years of age, to be counted as half an adult. 
Group B Estates: The allocation standard was that the NLA would not 
be less than 24 sq. ft. (2.23m2) per person. 
Nov. 1973 The Housing Authority decided to adopt a uniform standard at 3.25m2.  
1974/75 to 
1981/82 
The NLA would steadily increase beyond the standard of 3.25m2 per person 
and reached an average of 4.43m2 per person in 1981/82. 
1982 Following a review on the allocation standards, the Housing Authority 
decided to raise the allocation standard to 4.0m2 per person NLA or 5.5m2 
Internal Floor Area (IFA) per person.  
1987 The Housing Authority further raised the allocation standard for new 
lettings to provide each person with no less than 4.2m2 per person NLA or 
5.5m2 per person IFA. 
1991 Following a review, the Housing Authority approved in September 1991 the 
dual allocation standard; i.e. all tenants would be given a choice of two 
allocation standards with two correspondingly different Median 
Rent-Income Ratio (MRIR) limits. Hence, a tenant could choose between 
the allocation standard of 5.5m2 per person IFA with rent set at the MRIR 
limit of 15% or a new standard of 7m2 per person IFA with MRIR limit at 
18.5%. 
1992 After reviewing the dual allocation standards, the Housing Authority 
decided that the allocation standards of 5.5m2 per person IFA and 7m2 per 
person IFA should remain unchanged.  
Source: Office of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints, Report of the 
Investigation on Overcrowding Relief in Public Housing. 
 22
Appendix Table A2: Development of Public Housing in Hong Kong 
1954 Eight permanent six-storey buildings “Mark I” were completed to 
resettle the victims of the 1953 Shek Kip Mei Fire. 
1965 The resettlement blocks became high-rise buildings. For the first time a 
balcony and a toilet were provided inside each flat in “Mark IV, V and 
VI” buildings 
1978 January Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) 
8373 flats were offered for sale under the Phase I of the Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Private Sector Participation Scheme 
(PSPS) was introduced as a supplement to the HOS flats in the 
following year giving private developers a role in developing public 
housing estates. 
1981 October HOS 
Land value was excluded from HOS flats prices. 
1981  Middle Income Housing (MIH) scheme 
The Middle Income Housing (MIH) scheme was launched to meet the 
housing needs for families with income above the limit for HOS/PSPS 
flats 
1983 MIH 
Discontinuation of the MIH scheme 
1985 An “Extended Redevelopment Program” to clear sub-standard blocks 
built in the 60's began. 
1987 April Housing Subsidy Income Limit Policy 
The Housing Subsidy Income Limit Policy (the “double rent” policy) 
was introduced with the objective of reducing housing subsidy to public 
housing tenants who are no longer in need of it.  
1988 
 
Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) 
Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) was introduced by the Housing 
Authority (HA) to assist eligible families to purchase homes in the 
private sector.  The HA was reorganized to run as a statutory body and 
a chairman was appointed. 
1991 August 
 
A number of public rental blocks were offered for sale to sitting tenants.  
The response was very poor. 
1994 June Anti-speculation Measures 
A series of measures to curb speculation were announced. 
1994 August The Sandwich Class Housing Loan Scheme was launched by the 
Housing Society (HS)  
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1997 June HOS/PSPS Secondary Market Scheme was launched 
Launch of the Secondary Market Scheme.  It allowed owners of HOS 
and PSPS flats to sell their flats to public housing tenants from the 
fourth year of purchase without repaying the implicit land price subsidy 
to the HA. 
October Policy Address stated the government’s intention to build at least 85 000 
flats a year in the public and private sectors; to achieve a home 
ownership rate of 70% in ten years; and to reduce the average waiting 
time for public rental housing to three years. 
December 8 Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) announced offering up to 88% discount 
from the estimated market price.  Scheme was well received. 
1998 January Phase One of the Tenants Purchase Scheme with 27,000 flats in six 
estates offered for sale to existing tenants began.  
 
The Sandwich Class Housing Loan Scheme was abolished 
1998 March TPS 
A further 27,000 flats in six estates were offered for sale under the TPS 
Phase 2. By the end of the month, 85% of the tenants concerned had 
indicated an interest in buying. 
1998 February 
 
Relaxation of the resale restriction period (HOS flats) 
Relaxation of the resale restriction period under the HOS was endorsed 
by the HA, with effect from June 1999, the ten year resale restriction 
period has been shortened to five years, while the initial restriction 
period reduced from three years to two years. 
1999 March The Mortgage Subsidy Scheme (MSS) 
MSS was introduced as a pilot trial to promote home ownership among 
residents affected by the Comprehensive Redevelopment and Cottage 
Area Clearance Programme 
1999 February The Buy or Rent Option Scheme (BRO) 
The Buy or Rent Option Scheme (BRO) was introduced to help 
prospective tenants on the Waiting List for Public Rental Housing to 
purchase their own homes from the outset. 
1998 September HOS and Home Purchase Loan Scheme 
To meet the community's aspiration for home-ownership, the Authority 
opened up the HOS and HPLS to single persons. 
1999 April TPS  
A further 27 400 flats in six estates were offered for sale under Tenants 
Purchase Scheme Phase 3. 
1999 November Housing Production 
During the year, public housing production was at an unprecedented 
peak with an annual average of some 173 000 flats under construction. 
A total of 48 500 domestic flats and 11 commercial centres were 
completed. 
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2000 January  TPS 
The first batch of TPS flats, which had been sold for 2 years, became 
mature for re-sale under the Secondary Market Scheme. 
2000 March HOS 
In response to changes in market conditions, the HA decided to transfer 
16000 HOS flats scheduled for completion between 2000/01 and 
2003/04 to rental housing 
2000 April TPS 
A further 26,414 flats were offered for sale under TPS Phase 4. 
2000 June Housing Production Reached New Heights 
Production of homes reached new heights with the completion of 89,000 
flats during this year 
2001 February HOS and PSPS 
The HA endorsed the moratorium on the sale of HOS and PSPS flats for 
10 months until end June 2002 
2001 March 
 
Policy to stabilize the housing market 
Measures in the Statement on Housing Policy included cessation of the 
production and sale of HOS, PSPS flats as well as the sale of PRH flats 
under the TPS after phase 6 will cease from 2003 onwards 
2001 September Home Assistance Loan Scheme 
The Home Assistance Loan Scheme was launched to replace the HA’s 
Home Purchase Loan Scheme and the Housing Society’s Home Start 
Loan Scheme 
2002 November Suspension of the TPS and other measures 
The Secretary of Housing announced that the TPS would be suspended 
indefinitely with the exception of the TPS Phase 6A which had been 
announced, which was being withheld pending the completion of the 
condition survey on the drainage system and any necessary repair 
works.  He also announced a series of measures to eliminate the excess 
supply of housing units, including the indefinite suspension of 
production and sales of the HOS scheme beyond the already produced 
units. 
2003 May Home Assistance Loan Scheme 
The HA decided to close all applications for the Home Assistance Loan 
Scheme with immediate effect, pending a separate review on the scheme
Sources: 
1. Hong Kong Housing Authority, (various years), Annual Report, Hong Kong.  
2. Yeung, Y.M. and Timothy K.Y. Wong (2003). Fifty Years of Public Housing in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press  
